IN TRYING to understand the actions
of
the Japanese, the questions that call
out
loudest for answers are the most obvious
ones. What broke down on the scene to
allow
the behavior of Japanese soldiers to escape
so
totally the restraints that govern most
human
conduct?
Why did the Japanese officers
per-
mit and even encourage such a breakdown?
What was the complicity of the Japanese
gov-
emment? At the very least, what was its
reac-
tion to the reports it was getting through
its
own channels and to what it was hearing
from foreign sources on the scene?
To answer these questions
we must begin
with a little history.
The twentieth-century Japanese
identity
was forged in a thousand-year-old system
in
which social hierarchy was established
and
sustained through martial competition.
For
as far back as anyone could
remember, the is-
lands' powerful feudal lords employed
pri-
vate armies to wage incessant battle with
each
p.20
other; by the medieval times these armies
had evolved into the
distinctively Japanese samurai warrior
class, whose code of
conduct was called bushido (the
Way of the Warrior"). To die
in the service of one's lord was the greatest
honor a samurai
warrior could achieve in his lifetime.
Such codes of honor were
certainly not invented by Japan-
ese culture. The Roman poet Horace first
defined the debt
owed by the young men of each generation
to their rulers---
Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
But the samurai philosophy
went a giant step beyond defining military
service as fitting
and proper. So harsh was its code that
its most notable charac-
teristic was the moral imperative that
adherents commit suicide
if ever they failed to meet honorably
the obligations of military
service---often with the highly ceremonial
and extremely
painful ritual of hara-kiri, in which
the warrior met death by
unflinchingly disemboweling himself in
front of witnesses.
By the twelfth century the
head of the reigning (and thereby
most powerful) family, now called the
Shogun, offered the em-
peror, who was worshiped as the direct
descendant of the Sun
Goddess, military protection of his samurai
in exchange for di-
vine sanction of the entire ruling class.
A deal was struck. In
time the code of the samurai, initially
followed by only a small
percentage of the population, penetrated
deep into the Japan-
ese culture and became the model of honorable
behavior
among all young men.
Time did not erode the strength
of the bushido ethic, which
first emerged in the eighteenth century
and was practiced to ex-
tremes in the modern age. During World
War II the infamous
kamikaze suicide missions, in which Japanese
pilots ceremoni-
ously trained to fly their planes directly
into American aircraft,
dramatically impressed upon the West how
ready the young
men of Japan were to sacrifice their lives
for the emperor. But it
was more than a small elite group that
held to the view of
death over surrender. It
is striking to note that while the Allied
forces surrendered at the rate of 1 prisoner
for every 3 dead at
Saipan and Iwo Jima, the Japanese surrendered
at the rate of
only 1 per 120 dead.
Another force that gave Japan
its peculiar character was its
p.21
isolation, both physical and self-imposed.
By the late fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries Japan was
ruled by the Tokugawa
family, who sealed off the island nation
from foreign influ-
ence. This seclusion, intended to provide
security from the
wider world, instead insulated Japanese
society from the new
technology of the industrial revolution
taking place in Europe
and left it less secure. For 250 years
Japanese military technol-
ogy failed to advance beyond the bow and
sword.
By the nineteenth century
events beyond Japan's control
would knock the country out of its cocoon,
leaving it in a state
of insecurity and xenophobic desperation.
In 1852, U.S. Presi-
dent Millard Fillmore, frustrated by Japan's
refusal to open its
ports to commerce and taking the "white
man's burden" atti-
tude toward other societies commonly espoused
at the time to
rationalize European expansionism, decided
to end Japan's
isolation by dispatching Commander Matthew
Perry to the is-
land. Perry studied Japanese history carefully
and decided to
shock the Japanese into submission with
a massive display of
American military force. In July 1853,
he sent two ships belch-
ing black smoke into Tokyo Bay---giving
the people of Japan
their first glimpse of metal-clad, steam-powered
ships. Sur-
rounding himself with some sixty to seventy
aggressive-look-
ing men armed with swords and pistols,
Perry strode through
the capital of the Shogun and demanded
meetings with the
highest-ranking officials in Japan.
To say that the Japanese
were stunned by Perry's arrival
would be a gross understatement. "A
parallel situation," the
historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote of
the incident, "would
be an announcement by astronauts that
weird-looking aircraft
from outer space were on their way to
earth." The terrified
Tokugawa aristocracy prepared for battle,
hid their valuables,
and held panicked meetings among themselves.
But in the
end, they had no choice but to acknowledge
the superiority of
American military technology and to accept
the mission. With
this single visit, Perry not only forced
the Tokugawa to sign
treaties with the United States but broke
down the doors of
Japanese trade for other countries, such
as Britain, Russia, Ger-
many, and France.
p.22
The humiliation of
this proud people left a residue of fierce
resentment. Secretly some members of the
Japanese power
elite advocated immediate war with the
Western powers, but
others counseled prudence, arguing that
war would weaken
only Japan, not the foreigners. Those
taking the latter position
urged that the leadership placate the
intruders, learn from
them, and quietly plan their retaliation:
As we are not the equals of foreigners in the mechanical
arts, let us have
intercourse with foreign countries, learn their drill and tactics, and
when we have made the [Japanese] nations as united as one family,
we shall be able to go abroad and give lands in foreign coun- tries to those
who have distinguished themselves in battle; the sol- diers will
vie with one another in displaying their intrepidity, and it will not be too
late then to declare war Although that view did not prevail, the
words would prove
prophetic, for they described not only
the strategy the Japanese
would follow but the long-term horizons
of those who think
of life in terms of the state and not
of individuals.
With no clear course open to them, the
Tokugawa decided to
watch and wait---a decision that signed
the death warrant of
their reign. The Shogun's policy of appeasement,
so different
from what it required of its loyal adherents,
disgusted many
and supplied ammunition for its hawkish
opponents, who saw
the prudent response of the Shogun as
nothing more than
kowtowing servility before foreign barbarians.
Convinced that
the Shogun had lost his mandate to rule,
rebel clans forged al-
liances to overthrow the regime and restore
the emperor to
power.
In 1868 the rebels
achieved victory in the name of the Meiji
emperor and ignited a revolution to transform
a patchwork of
warring fiefdoms into a modern, powerful
Japan. They ele-
vated the sun cult of Shinto to a state
religion and used the em-
peror as a national symbol to sweep away
tribalism and unite
the islands. Determined to achieve eventual
victory over the
west, the new imperial government adopted
the samurai ethic
p.23
of bushido as the moral code for
all citizens. The foreign threat
acted as a further catharsis for the islands.
In an era later
known as the Meiji Restoration, Japan
resounded with nation-
alistic slogans, such as "Revere the Emperor!
Expel the barbar-
ians! " and "Rich country, strong army!
"
With astonishing rapidity,
the Japanese hurled themselves into
the modern age---scientifically, economically,
and mili-
tarily. The government sent the best students
abroad to
study science and technology at western
universities, seized
control of its own industry to create
factories for military
production, and replaced the locally controlled
feudal
armies with a national conscript army.
It also meticulously
analyzed the defense cultures of the United
States and Eu-
rope, favoring above all the German military
system. But the
knowledge of Western technology and defense
strategies
brought back by its foreign-educated students
shattered the
country's old confidence in Japanese military
superiority, leav-
ing it deeply uneasy about the inevitability
of victory in its fu-
ture showdown with the West.
By the late nineteenth century Japan was
ready to flex its mus-
cles, testing its new strength on Asian
neighbors. In 1876 the
Meiji government dispatched to Korea a
naval force of two
gunboats and three transports and forced
the Korean govern-
ment to sign a treaty of commerce---a
move hauntingly remi-
niscent of what Perry had forced on Japan.
Then it clashed with China
over Korea. An 1885 treaty had
established Korea as a coprotectorate
of both China and
Japan, but hostilities broke out within
a decade when the
Chinese tried to quell a Korean rebellion
backed by Japanese
ultranationalists. In September 1894,
only six weeks after war
was declared, the Japanese not only captured
Pyongyang but
crushed the Chinese northern fleet at
sea. The Qing govern-
ment was forced to sign the humiliating
Treaty of Shimono-
seki, under which the Chinese were made
to pay the Japanese
200 million taels in war indemnities and
to cede to Japan
Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Liaodong region
of Manchuria,
p.24
and four more treaty ports. This was later
called the first Sino-
Japanese war.
For Japan the triumph
would have been complete had it not
been later marred by the intrusion of
Western powers. After the
war the Japanese won the greatest prize
of the war---the
Liaodong Peninsula---but were forced to
surrender the last by
the tripartite intervention of Russia,
France, and Germany. This
further illustration of the power of faraway
European govern-
ments to dictate Japanese conduct only
stiffened Japan's re-
solve to gain military supremacy over
its Western tormentors.
By 1904 the nation had doubled the size
of its army and
gained self-sufficiency in the production
of armaments.
That strategy soon
paid off. Japan was able to boast of de-
feating not only China in battle but Russia
as well. In the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the Japanese
recapture of Port
Arthur in the Liaodong Peninsula and naval
victory at
Tsushima gained half of the Sakhalin Islands
and commercial
supremacy in Manchuria. This was heady
stuff for a proud
country that had been chafing for fifty
years under the humili-
ation dealt it by the Western nations.
Giddy with triumph, a
Japanese professor summed up the sentiments
of his country
when he declared that Japan was "destined
to expand and gov-
ern other nations."
Largely because of
these successes, the early part of the
twentieth century was a euphoric time
for Japan. Moderniza- tion had earned for
the country not only military prestige but
unprecedented economic prosperity. The
First World War cre-
ated a huge demand for Japanese steel
and iron production as
well as for Japanese textiles and foreign
trade. Stock prices sky-
rocketed, and moguls sprang up from obscurity,
dazzling the
country with their extravagance. Even
Japanese women---tradi-
tionally cloistered away in this male-dominated
society---were
seen gambling away fortunes at casinos
and racetracks.
Perhaps if the prosperity
had lasted, a solid middle class
might have emerged in Japan to provide
the people with the
strength to check imperial military influence.
But it did not. In-
stead, Japan would soon be faced with
the single most disas-
trous economic crisis in its modern history---a
crisis that
p.25
would wipe out its previous gains, push
it to the brink of star-
vation, and propel it down the path of
war.
The 1920s drew down
the curtain on Japan's golden era of
prosperity. When the end of World War
I halted the previously
insatiable demand for military products,
Japanese munitions
factories were shut down and thousands
of laborers were
thrown out of work. The 1929 stock market
crash in the
United States, and the depression that
followed it, also reduced
American purchases of luxuries, crippling
the Japanese silk ex-
port trade.
As important, many international
businessmen and con-
sumers went out of their way to shun Japanese
products in the
postwar decade, even though Japan had
been on the Allied
side in the First World War. Although
both the European na-
tions and the Japanese expanded their
overseas empires with
the spoils of the First World War, Japanese
expansion was not
looked on in the same way. Repulsed by
aggressive Japanese ac-
tions toward China through the first decades
of the new cen-
tury, and even more so by Japan's attempts
at Western-style
colonialism in the former German colonies
it now controlled
as a consequence of the war settlements,
Western financiers be-
gan to invest more heavily in the Chinese.
In turn, China, en-
raged by the Versailles decision to grant
Japan the German
rights and concessions in the Shantung
Peninsula, organized
widespread boycotts of Japanese goods.
These development
shurt the Japanese economy still further
and gave rise to the
popular belief that Japan had once again
become the victim of
an international conspiracy.
The downturn in the
economy devastated the average Japan-
ese community. Businesses shut down, and
unemployment
soared. Destitute farmers and fishermen
sold their daughters
into prostitution. Soaring inflation,
labor strikes, and a
tremendous earthquake in September 1923
only exacerbated
the dismal conditions.
An increasingly popular
argument during the depression
was that Japan needed to conquer new territory
to ward off
p.26
mass starvation. The population
had swollen from some 30
million at the time of the Meiji Restoration
to almost 65 mil-
lion in 1930, making it increasingly difficult
for Japan to feed
its people. With great effort, Japanese
farmers had pushed up
the yield per acre until it would increase
no more, and by the
1920s agricultural production had leveled
off. The continually
expanding population forced Japan to rely
heavily on im-
ported foodstuffs every year, and between
the 1910s and the
end of the 1920s rice imports tripled.
They had once been paid
for by Japan's textile exports, but the
latter were now subject to
reduced foreign demand, intense competition,
and often dis-
criminatory tariffs.
By the 1920s young
radicals in the Japanese army were argu-
ing that military expansion was crucial
to the country's sur-
vival. In his book Addresses to Young
Men, Lieutenant Colonel
Hashimoto Kingoro wrote:
There are only three ways left to Japan co escape from
the pres-
sures of surplus population... emigration, advance into world
markets, and expansion of territory. The first door, emigration,
has been barred to us by the anti-Japanese immigration poli-
cies of other countries. The second door... is being pushed
shut by tariff barriers and the abrogation of commercial
treaties. What should Japan do when two of the three doors'
have been closed against her?
Other Japanese writers
pointed to the spacious territories of
other countries, complaining about the
injustice of it all, espe-
cially since these other countries were
not making the most of
their land by achieving the high per-acre
yields that Japanese
farmers had obtained. They looked enviously
upon not only
China's vast land resources but those
of Western countries.
Why, the military propagandist
Sadao Araki asked, should
Japan remain content with 142,270 square
miles, much of it
barren, to feed 60 million mouths, while
countries like Aus-
tralia and Canada had more than 3 million
square miles to
feed 6.5 million people each? These discrepancies
were unfair.
To the ultranationalists, the United States
enjoyed some of the
greatest advantages of all: Sadao Araki
pointed out that the
p.27
United States possessed not only 3 million
square miles of
home territory but 700,000 square miles
of colonies.
If expansion westward
to the Pacific Ocean was the manifest
destiny of the nineteenth-century United
States, then China
was twentieth-century Japan's manifest
destiny. It was almost
inevitable that this homogenous people
of high personal es-
teem would see the socially fragmented
and loosely governed
expanse of China as having been put there
for their use and ex-
ploitation. Nor were Japan's
covetous intentions limited only
to Asia. In 1925, just a short three years
after Japan entered
into a capital ship limitation treaty
with the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Italy that
afforded it a distinctive role
as the world's third largest naval power,
Okawa Shumei, a
member of the army general staff, wrote
a book that insisted
not only on Japan's destiny to "free"
Asia but also on the in-
evitability of world war between Japan
and the United States.
In the concluding chapter of his book,
he was more prophetic
than he realized when he predicted a divine---almost
apoca-
lyptic---struggle between the two powers:
"Before a new world appears, there must be a deadly fight
between the powers of the West and the East. this theory is realized
in the American challenge to Japan. The strongest country in Asia
is Japan and the strongest coun- try that represents Europe is America....
These two countries are destined to fight. Only God knows when
it will be. "
By the 1930s the Japanese government
found itself mired in in-
trigue as those who favored using Japan's
newly acquired tech-
nological skills to build a better society
competed for influence
with those who wanted to use the nation's
military superiority
over its neighbors to embark on a program
of foreign con-
quest. Expansionist ideologies gained
fervent support from
right-wing ultranationalists, who called
for a military dictator-
ship that would limit personal wealth,
nationalize property,
and dominate Asia. These ideas fueled
the ambitions of junior
military officers, whose rural backgrounds
and youth made
them naturally distrustful of Tokyo politicians
as well as impa-
tient for immediate access to power. Though
the officers feuded
p.28
among themselves, they shared a similar
mission: to overhaul
society and eliminate all bureaucratic,
economic, and political
obstacles to what they believed to be
Japan's divine mission to
avenge itself against the Europeans and
dominate Asia.
Step by step, the interventionists
forced a series of compro-
mises from the moderate elements in government.
But disap-
pointed by the pace of change, they began
to conspire among
themselves to topple the government. In
1931 a coup was
planned but abandoned. In 1932 a group
of naval officers
launched a terrorist attack in Tokyo that
killed Prime Minister
Inukai Tsuyoshi but failed to secure martial
law.
On February 26, 1936, a clique
of young officers launched a
bold coup d'etat that took the lives of
several statesmen.
Though the coup paralyzed downtown Tokyo
for more than
three days, it ultimately failed and the
ringleaders were jailed
or executed. Power shifted from the extremists
to a more cau-
tious faction within the government, though
it is important to
point out that even this faction shared
many of the young offi-
cers' fanatical views when it came to
Japan's right to a domi-
nant role in Asia.
It soon became apparent
to some Japanese ultranationalists
that if they wanted to control China they
would have to move
fast. For there were signs that China,
forced to submit to Japan-
ese demands in 1895, was trying to strengthen
itself as a na-
tion---signs that gave the Japanese expansionists
a sense of
urgency in their mission.
China had indeed used
the past two decades to transform it-
self from a disintegrating empire into
a struggling national re-
public. In 1911 rebel armies defeated
the Qing imperial forces
and ended more than two centuries of Manchu
rule. During
the 1920s the Nationalists under Chiang
Kai-shek successfully
fought the warlords of northern China
to unify the country.
They also announced as a goal the elimination
of unfair treaty
agreements foisted upon the Qing dynasty
by foreign powers.
As Chiang's movement gained momentum,
it threatened
Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.
Something had
p.29
to be done, and quickly, before China
grew too powerful to be
conquered.
With the approval of
the Japanese government, the military
began to intervene more aggressively in
Chinese affairs. In
1928 they engineered the assassination
of Chang Tsolin, the
warlord ruler of Manchuria, when he failed
to give them his
full cooperation. The murder only served
to infuriate the Chi-
nese people, who organized more boycotts
against Japanese
goods.
By the 1930s Japan
had launched an undeclared war with
China. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese
army blew up the
tracks of a Japanese-owned railway in
southern Manchuria,
hoping to incite an incident. When the
blasts failed to derail
an express train, the Japanese killed
the Chinese guards instead
and fabricated a story for the world press
about Chinese sabo-
teurs. This incident gave the Japanese
an excuse to seize
Manchuria, which was renamed Manchukuo
and where the
Japanese installed Pu Yi, the last emperor
of China and heir of
the Manchu dynasty, as puppet ruler. The
seizure of Manchuria,
however, generated anti-Japanese sentiment
in China, which
was whipped up by Nationalist activists.
Feelings ran high on
both sides and erupted in bloodshed in
1932 when a Shanghai
mob attacked five Japanese Buddhist priests,
leaving one of
them dead. Japan immediately retaliated
by bombing the city,
killing tens of thousands of civilians.
When the slaughter at
Shanghai aroused worldwide criticism,
Japan responded by
isolating itself from the international
community and with-
drawing, in 1933, from the League of Nations.
To prepare for the inevitable war with
China, Japan had spent
decades training its men for combat. The
molding of young
men to serve in the Japanese military
began early in life, and in
the 1930s the martial influence seeped
into every aspect of
Japanese boyhood. Toy shops became virtual
shrines to war,
selling arsenals of toy soldiers, tanks,
helmets, uniforms, rifles,
antiaircraft guns, bugles, and howitzers.
Memoirs from that
time describe preadolescent boys waging
mock battles in the
p.30
streets, using bamboo poles as imaginary
rifles. Some even tied
logs of wood on their backs and fantasized
about dying as "hu-
man bomb" heroes in suicide missions.
Japanese schools operated
like miniature military units. In-
deed, some of the teachers were military
officers, who lectured
students on their duty to help Japan fulfill
its divine destiny of
conquering Asia and being able to stand
up to the world's na-
tions as a people second to none. They
taught young boys how
to handle wooden models of guns and older
boys how to han-
dle real ones. Textbooks became vehicles
for military propa-
ganda; one geography book even used the
shape of Japan as
justification for expansion: "We
appear to be standing in the vanguard of Asia, advancing bravely into
the Pacific. At the
same time we appear ready to defend the
Asian continent from
outside attack." Teachers also instilled
in boys hatred and con-
tempt for the Chinese people, preparing
them psychologically
for a future invasion of the Chinese mainland.
One historian
tells the story of a squeamish Japanese
schoolboy in the 1930s
who burst into tears when told to dissect
a flog. His teacher
slammed his knuckles against the boy's
head and yelled, "Why
are you crying about one
lousy frog? When you grow up you'll
have to kill one hundred, two hundred
chinks! "
(And yet with
all this psychological programming the story
is much more complicated. "There was a
deep ambivalence in
Japanese society about China," Oxford
historian Rana Mitter
observes. "It was not all racist contempt,
as it was for the Kore-
ans: on the one hand, they recognized
China as a source of
culture that they had drawn on heavily;
on the other, they were
exasperated by the mess that China was
in by the early twenti-
eth century. Ishiwara Kanji, architect
of the Manchurian Inci-
dent of 1931, was a big fan of the 1911
Revolution. Many
Chinese, including Sun Yatsen and Yuan
Shikai, drew on
Japanese help and training in the years
before and after the
1911 Revolution. The Japanese also sponsored
Boxer Indem-
nity Scholarships and Dojinkai hospitals
for the Chinese, and
scholars like Tokio Hashimoto genuinely
appreciated Chinese
culture. Japan's Foreign Office and army
experts on China were
often very well trained and knowledgeable
about the country."
p.31
This knowledge and tempering, however,
would rarely pass
down to the ordinary soldier.)
The historical
roots of militarism in Japanese schools
stretched back to the Meiji Restoration.
In the late nineteenth
century the Japanese minister of education
declared that
schools were run not for the benefit of
the students but for the
good of the country. Elementary school
teachers were trained
like military recruits, with student-teachers
housed in barracks
and subjected to harsh discipline and
indoctrination. In 1890
the Imperial Rescript on Education emerged;
it laid down a
code of ethics to govern not only students
and teachers but
every Japanese citizen. The Rescript was
the civilian equivalent
of Japanese military codes, which valued
above all obedience
to authority and unconditional loyalty
to the emperor. In every
Japanese school a copy of the Rescript
was enshrined with a
portrait of the emperor and taken out
each morning to be read.
It was reputed that more
than one teacher who accidentally
stumbled over the words committed suicide
to atone for the
insult to the sacred document.
By the 1930s the Japanese
educational system had become
regimented and robotic. A
visitor to one of its elementary schools expressed pleasant surprise at
seeing thousands of chil-
dren waving flags and marching in unison
in perfect lines; quite
clearly the visitor had seen the discipline
and order but not the
abuse required to establish
and maintain it. It was common-
place for teachers to behave like sadistic
drill sergeants, slapping
children across the cheeks, hitting them
with their fists, or blud-
geoning them with bamboo or wooden swords.
Students were
forced to hold heavy objects, sit on their
knees, stand barefoot
in the snow, or run around the playground
until they collapsed
from exhaustion. There were certainly
few visits to the schools
by indignant or even concerned parents.
The pressure to conform
to authority intensified if the
schoolboy decided to become a soldier.
Vicious hazing and a
relentless pecking order usually squelched
any residual spirit
of individualism in him. Obedience was
touted as a supreme
virtue, and a sense of individual self-worth
was replaced by a
sense of value as a small cog in the larger
scheme of things. To
p.32
establish this sublimation of individuality
to the common
good, superior officers or older soldiers
slapped recruits for al-
most no reason at all or beat them severely
with heavy wooden
rods. According to the author Iritany
Toshio, officers often jus-
tified unauthorized punishment by saying,
"I do not beat you
because I hate you. I beat
you because I care for you. Do you
think I perform these acts with hands
swollen and bloody in a
state of madness?"- Some youths died under
such brutal phys-
cal conditions; others committed suicide;the
majority became
tempered vessels into which the military
could pour a new set
of life goals.
Training was no less
grueling a process for aspiring officers.
In the 1920s all cadets had to pass through
the Military Acad-
emy at Ichigaya. With its overcrowded
barracks, unheated
study rooms, and inadequate food, the
place bore a greater re-
semblance to a prison than a school. The
intensity of the train-
ing in Japan surpassed that of most Western
military
academies: in England an officer was commissioned
after some
1,372 hours of classwork and 245 hours
of private study, but
in Japan the standards were 3,382 hours
of classwork and
2,765 hours of private study. The cadets
endured a punishing
daily regimen of physical exercise and
classes in history, geog-
raphy, foreign languages, mathematics,
science, logic, drawing,
and penmanship. Everything in the curriculum
was bent to-
ward the goal of perfection and triumph.
Above all the Japan-
ese cadets were to adopt "a will which
knows no defeat." So
terrified were the cadets of any hint
of failure that examination
results were kept secret, to minimize
the risk of suicide.
The academy was like
an island to itself, sealed off from the
rest of the world. The Japanese cadet
enjoyed neither privacy
nor any opportunity to exercise individual
leadership skills.
His reading material was carefully censored,
and leisure time
was nonexistent. History and science were
distorted to project
an image of the Japanese as a superrace.
"During.these impres- sionable years they have been walled off
from all outside plea-
sures, interests or influences, " one
Western writer observed of
the Japanese officers. "The atmosphere
of the narrow groove
along which they have moved has been saturated
with a special
p.33
national and a special military propaganda.
Already from a
race psychologically far removed from
us, they have been re-
moved still further. "
In the summer of 1937
Japan finally succeeded in provoking a
full-scale war with China. In July a Japanese
regiment, gar-
risoned by treaty in the Chinese city
of Tientsin, had been con-
ducting night maneuvers near the ancient
Marco Polo Bridge.
During a break several shots were fired
at the Japanese in the
darkness, and a Japanese soldier failed
to appear during roll
call. Using this incident as an excuse
to exercise its power in
the region, Japanese troops advanced upon
the Chinese fort of
Wanping near the bridge and demanded that
its gates be
opened so that they could search for the
soldier. When the
Chinese commander refused, the Japanese
shelled the fort.
By the end of July,
Japan had tightened its grasp on the en-
tire Tientsin-Peking region and by August
the Japanese had in-
vaded Shanghai:The second Sino-Japanese
War was no longer
reversible.
But conquering China
proved to be a more difficult task
than the Japanese anticipated. In Shanghai
alone Chinese
forces outnumbered the Japanese marines
ten to one, and Chi-
ang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist
government, had re-
served his best troops for the battle.
That August, while attempting to land thirty-five thousand
fresh troops on the
docks of Shanghai, the Japanese encountered
their first set-
back. A hidden Chinese artillery emplacement
opened fire and
killed several hundred men, including
a cousin of the Empress
Nagako. For months the Chinese defended
the metropolis
with extraordinary valor. To the chagrin
of the Japanese, the
battle of Shanghai proceeded slowly, street
by street, barricade
by barricade.
In the 1930s, Japanese military leaders had boasted---and
seriously believed---that Japan could
conquer all of mainland
China within three months. But when a
battle in a single Chi-
nese city alone dragged from summer to
fall, and then from fall
to winter, it shattered Japanese fantasies
of an easy victory. Here,
p.34
this primitive people, illiterate in military
science and poorly
trained, had managed to fight the superior
Japanese to a stand-
still. When Shanghai finally fell in November,
the mood of the
imperial troops had turned ugly, and many,
it was said, lusted
for revenge as they marched toward Nanking.
NOTES
CHAPTER 1: THE PATH TO NANKING
p.223
19. For as far
back as anyone could remember: Tanaka Yuki, Hidden Horrors: Japanese
War Crimes in World War II (Boulder, Co.:
Westview, 1996),
pp. 206-8. (Although Tanaka is the author's
surname, he uses
an American-style of presenting his name as
Yuki Tanaka for
this English-language book.) According to
Tanaka, the modem
Japanese corrupted the ancient code of
bushido
for their own purposes. The original code dictated
that warriors
die for just causes, not trivial ones. But during
World War II,
officers were committing ritual suicide for the
most absurd of
reasons, such as for stumbling over their
words when reciting
the code. The concept of loyalty in
bushido
was also replaced by blind obedience, and courage by
reckless violence.
20. It is striking
to note: Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The
Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New
York: Random
House, 1991), p. vii.
21. "A parallel
situation": Samuel Eliot Morison, "Old Bruin": Com- modore Matthew C.
Perry 1794-1858 (Boston: Atlantic-Little,
Brown, 1967), p. 319.
22. "As we are
not the equals of foreigners,": Delmer M. Brown, Na- tionalism
in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis (Berkeley
and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1955), p. 75.
(Italics mine.)
(Brown's citation: Satow, trans., Japan 1853-1864,
or Genii Yume
Monogatari, p. 4).
24. "destined to expand
and govern other nations":Taiyo, July 1905,
quoted in ibid.,
p. 144.
24. Modernization
had earned for the country: Ibid., p. 152.
26. The population
had swollen: Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from
the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: Harper-
Collins, 1991),
p. 189.
.
26. "There are
only three ways left to Japan": W. T. deBary, ed.,
Sources of
the Japanese Tradition (New York, 1958), pp.
796-97, quoted
in ibid., p. 189.
27.Why, the
military propagandist Sadao Araki: Quoted in ibid.,
p.189.
27. Nor were
Japan's covetous intentions: Ibid., p. 393. For more in-
formation about the
ambitions of some Japanese ultra-
nationalists regarding
the United States during that era, see
Records of the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, 1882- 1954,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Intelligence Division---Naval At-
tache Reports, 1886-1939,
box 525, entry 98, record group
38, National Archives.
As early as December 1932, a U.S. naval
intelligence
report noted that best-sellers in Japan tended to
be books on war---particularly
on the possibility of American-
Japanese war. This
report and others analyzed the content of
Japanese books, articles,
pamphlets, and lectures that dwelled
on the topic of a Japanese
invasion of the United States. Some
of these publications
bore titles such as "The Alaska Air At-
tack," "The Assault
on Hawaii," and "The California Attack."
Here are a few examples
of Japanese propaganda from the
early 1930s that made
their way into American naval Intel-
gene files (the following
names come directly from an
English language report
and may be misspelled) :
-A
lecture by Captain K. Midzuno revealed that the
Japanese military not
only developed strategies for attacking
Pearl Harbor from the
air but also foresaw the possibility of
American raids on Tokyo.
-In Japan
in Danger: A Great Naval War in t‚ˆe Pacific
Ocean, Nakadzima Takesi
described scenarios of a victorious
war waged by the Japanese
against the United States through
naval battles and air
bombardment.
-In Increasing
Japanese-American Danger, Vice Admiral
Sesa Tanetsugu wrote
that he was convinced of the inevitabil-
ity of Japanese-American
conflict.
-Ikedzaki
Talakta presented in the Predestined Japanese-Amer- ican War a compilation
of articles on the subject of the inevitabil-
lity of a Japanese-American
war. A newspaper review lauded this
book as "a work of
passionate love for the native land" and as-
sured readers that
"if Japan draws its sword, the false, haughty
America will be powerless"
(February 3, 1933 report, p. 260).
27. "Before
a new world appears": Delmer Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 187;
see also Okawa Shumei, "Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon
(Asia, Europe, and
Japan)," p. 82, translated in "Analyses,''
IPS document
no. 64, pp. 3-4 (italics added).
29. To prepare
for the inevitable war with China: Tessa Morris-
Suzuki, Showa:
An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan (New York:
Schocken, 1985),
pp. 21-29.
30. "We appear
to be standing in the vanguard of Asia": Quoted in
Ian Buruma, The
Wages of Guilt (New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1994),
pp. 191-92.
30. "Why are
you crying about one lousy frog?": Ibid,, p, 172,
30. "deep ambivalence in Japanese society":
Letter from Rana Mitter
to author, July
17, 1997.
31. It was reputed
that more than one teacher: Harries and Harries,
Soldiers of the
Sun, p. 41.
31. A visitor
to one of its elementary schools: Iritani Toshio, Group Psychology
of the Japanese in Wartime (London and New York:
Kegan Paul International,
1991), pp. 177, 191.
31. abuse:
Ibid.
32. "I do not beat
you because I hate you": Ibid., p. 189.
32. The intensity
of the training in Japan: 106/5485, February 1928
report,
p. 136, Papers of the British War Office in the Public
Record Office,
Kew, London. An OSS report on Japanese army
training summarizes
the process of indoctrination: "The
smallest infraction
of error in regulations brings instant and
severe punishment.
Act tough-shout, don't talk--scowl,
don't look pleasant--be
tough--have no desires--forget your
family at home--never
show emotionalism--do everything
the hard way--don't
let yourself be comfortable--train and
discipline your desires
for comfort, food and water--suffer
pain and hardship
in silence--you are a son of Heaven"; re-
port no. 8974-B, dissemination
no. A-17403, distributed De-
cember 28, 1943, Research
and Analysis Branch Divisions,
Intelligence Reports
"Regular" Series, 1941-45, box 621, entry
16, record group 226,
National Archives.
32. "During
these impressionable years": 106/5485, February 1928
report, p. 84,
Papers of the British War Office.
33. That August,
while attempting to land thirty-five thousand fresh troops: David
Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New
York: Morrow, 1971),
p. 11.
33. In the 1930s
Japanese military leaders: John Toland, The Ris- ing Sun: The Decline
and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New
York: Random House),
p. 47. "Crush the Chinese in three
months and they will
sue for peace," Minister Sugiyama
predicted.
