(U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1966, pp.-). Reprinted by Shuppan in Tokyo,1998.
Details for initial moves for the Occupation of Japan were outlined to the Imperial delegates which had arrived at Manila 19 August and had been in session with GHQ staff officers that and the succeeding day.50$B!!(B When they departed again for Tokyo, they carried with them four documents which outlined the requirements laid down by SCAP for the spearhead of occupation, for the formal surrender ceremonies, and for the subsequent reception of Occupation forces.51
In these documents SCAP stated that the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese armed forces would occur in Tokyo Bay aboard a United States battleship on 31 August. To prepare$B!!(Bfor this$B!$(Bhe indicated that an advance party would arrive by air at Atsugi airdrome near Tokyo, that United States Navy forces would arrive in Sagami Bay, immediately south of Tokyo Bay, and that naval forces would advance into Tokyo Bay.$B!!(BThese movements were set for 26 August. Airborne forces accompanying the$B!!(BSupreme Commander were expected to land at Atsugi 28 August while, simultaneously,$B!!(Bnaval and marine forces were to land in the vicinity of Yokosuka Naval Base. The landing and establishing of airborne and naval forces would continue during the two$B!!(Bdays prior to the surrender ceremony.
The second document concerned the advance landing party and its point of entry. It specified that the immediate area surrounding the city of Tokyo was defined as the $B!H(B Tokyo Bay Area$B!%!I(B52$B!!(BThis area comprised the region from Choshi north of Kumagawa, east of Ishioka, and southeast to Choshi. The boundary across the harbor entrance included the island of Nishima. Within the Tokyo Bay Area the portion from Otsuki eastward along the southern city limit line and extending across the Bay to Chiba and south of Amatsu, was defined as the " Area of Initial Evacuation." (Plate No. 9)
The advance party would make preparations for the entry of the Supreme Commander and his accompanying airborne and naval forces into the Area of Initial Evacuation. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters would be required to acknowledge to the Supreme Commander by 25 August safe conduct for the advance party which was to consist of about 150 persons, transported in planes with standard U. S. markings. This party was scheduled to land at Atsugi airfield. The Japanese would be required to provide for the following : security and preservation from harm of personnel, airplanes and equipment of the party while in the Area of Initial Evacuation ; provision of every courtesy and facility to members of the party in the accomplishment of their mission ; provision for suitable quarters and a police escort to insure absolute safety for each member of the party ; the services of senior officers from the Japanese Army Air Headquarters, the Naval Air Headquarters, and the Japanese Army and Naval Headquarters, available to the commander of the advance party upon his arrival at Atsugi and prepared to provide such information as might be required as to facilities in the Area of Initial Evacuation ; free communication by radio between the advance party and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Manila.
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters was to evacuate all combatant units of the Japanese armed forces from the Atsugi airfield area, with the exception of civil police, which were to be maintained as necessary to prevent overt acts. The airdrome was to be in full operational condition. Notification would be required prior to 25 August as to the identity and frequency of the radio station in the Tokyo area with which the advance party could communicate in flight concerning time of arrival, landing instructions and other matters relating to the arrival of the party.
The third document, in addition to providing for the immobilizing and disarming of Japanese naval and air force units and installations, required provision for the safety of the United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees pending the arrival of Occupation forces53. Camps were to be marked to enable Allied aircraft to identify them. The Yokosuka Naval Base was to be ready for occupation by 27 August. All combatant units of the Japanese armed forces were to be evacuated from the Area of Initial Evacuation and confined to the limits of their assigned bivouacs, with the exception of civil police ; measures were to be guaranteed for the provision of adequate accommodations, billet and camp area facilities and utilities in the Area of Initial Occupation for the Supreme Commander and his accompanying forces.
It was directed that on the date scheduled for the arrival of General MacArthur in Japan, members of the Imperial General Staff would be available for conference with representatives of the Supreme Commander at Atsugi airfield upon arrival, and at such times and places thereafter as might be directed for the prompt settlement of all matters requiring attention. Guides and interpreters familiar with the Area of Initial Evacuation would be available.
General measures to be taken by 25 August by the forces of the Allied Powers were announced as follows : Allied aircraft would conduct daylight and night surveillance flights over Japan and Japanese controlled areas ; Allied aircraft would drop supplies to the United Nations prisoner of war and internee camps ; naval forces would occupy the coastal waters of Japan and Japanese controlled areas. Mine-sweeping operations by Allied naval forces were scheduled to be initiated in the ports of Osaka. Sasebo, Nagasaki, Takasu, Jinsen, Tsingtao, Canton, Shanghai, Hongkong, and Singapore. In these prescribed duties, the Allied forces would be unmolested.
The fourth document concerned the initial Occupation forces in the Kanoya Area of southern Kyushu54. It stipulated that an advance party, representing General Headquarters, would enter the area I September to prepare for the entry into the "Kanoya Area " of seaborne and airborne initial forces on the next day. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters was directed to provide, by noon 30 August, guarantee of full security for entry into the Kanoya area of this advance party, consisting of twenty personnel, transported in two airplanes bearing standard U.S. markings. Exact time of arrival would be communicated to Kanoya radio station by direct message from the planes in flight. Ranking members of Japanese staffs were to hold themselves in readiness for conferences with high ranking American officers landing at Kanoya airfield.
The return to Tokyo of the Manila envoys was delayed when one of the planes carrying the principals experienced engine trouble and had to be " ditched." The pilot was able to beach the plane so that, although all passengers were shaken up, none was hurt. It required most of the night, however, to arrange transportation to Tokyo and this interval was marked by considerable anxiety 55. Prime Minister Prince Higashi Kuni sat up all night wondering "whether $B!F(Bour invigorated Tokko Tai $B!G(B(air attack units) had shot them down.$B!I(B If he was glad to hear that both planes were safe, he was far happier to learn that General MacArthur's terms for his nation were not so severe as he had feared 56.
Higashi Kuni promptly took General Kawabe to the palace to make "a very minute report. " According to Higashi Kuni, "The Emperor was quite relieved"57.
General MacArthur's humane and considerate occupation policies unquestionably took Japan by complete surprise 58. A Domei broadcast, 18 August, stating that the Allies had no intention of confiscating private property, reassured Japanese who had feared that Americans would follow the Japanese policy of looting civilian goods.
Immediately following the Emperor's surrender proclamation, officials of the Agriculture-Commerce Ministry and the Chief of the Tokyo Economics Board estimated that Japan's food supplies would be entirely dislocated because of expected heavy food requisitions by Occupation forces. Yomiuri-Hochi warned that the food requirements of the "tens of thousands " of Occupation troops would have a "great effect upon our present and future livelihood."59
When Japanese armies invaded foreign lands, the conquered populations, despite their poverty, had been expected to furnish not only full but even luxurious provisions for the invaders. Japan consequently looked upon General MacArthur as the precursor of a truly enlightened civilization.
Confidence in General MacArthur's justice went far toward reassuring Japanese who still credited pure wartime propaganda rumors 60.$B!!(BTokyo Shimbun, among others, deplored that wild gossip swept Japan. Of this kind Yomiuri reported : . . . within three days after surrender Tokyo citizens feared that :
American soldiers would loot Japan.
Americans would rob Japan of all the food.
Women and girls would be violated.
All men would be killed.
What was left of Tokyo would be devastated 61.
he American decision to reserve all Japanese food resources for the Japanese people and to supply the Occupation forces and their dependents with foodstuffs brought from America therefore produced a profound, completely unexpected, and highly favorable impression 62.
During the next few days, while Japanese people were attempting to adjust their thinking to this new concept of enemy occupation, the weather became unfavorable and a series of typhoons lashed the home islands ; nevertheless, the people heard the drone of Allied aircraft overhead and from force of habit ran to their air raid shelters. There were no bombs ; instead, this was the beginning of the air force missions to drop relief supplies of food, medicine and clothing to the wretched Allied prisoners of war and civilians interned in camps in Japan. The missions continued despite extremely unfavorable weather which became sufficiently adverse to delay the implementation of " Blacklist " by forty-elght hours.
General Eichelberger had moved his Eighth Army Command Post from the eastern coastal plain of Leyte to Okinawa on 26 August. On Okinawa both the 11th Airborne and the 27th Division were stalled on the scheduled airlift to Japan by the succession of typhoons.
All available troop transports of the Far East Air Force and dozens of the huge " Sky trains " and " Skymasters " of the Pacific Air Transport Command had been mobilized at Okinawa for this mammoth air operation$B!=(Bthe greatest aerial movement during the Pacific war. The initial target date was officially postponed from 26 August to 28 August because of the adverse weather 63.
Then the weather cleared and a cool, refreshing breeze, "very refreshing to the spirit," blew over the Kanto Plain 64.
At Atsugi airfield near Tokyo, Japanese planes sat helplessly stripped of their propellers. A picked detachment of the Naval Security Corps, armed with clubs, guarded the Atsugi airfield where Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Lt. Gen. Senichi Kamada, Captain Chuzaburo Yamazumi and Ken Tsurumi of the Foreign Office awaited the arrival of the American advance forces.
The heralds of that advance force, American Corsairs and Grummans, had appeared with the dawn of that historic day and continued to fly in strong formations over the entire Tokyo Bay and Atsugi area.
The first American formations flying from Okinawa were not expected until 0900, but half an hour earlier a twin-engined aircraft appeared in the skies from the south. It was a C-46 transport. The plane circled the field and then came in from the south to touch down upon the center runway at 0828. This plane was followed by fifteen others 65.
From the leading plane debarked Colonel Charles P. Tench, GSC, of the G-3 Section of GHQ , commanding the advance party 66. Waiting automobiles conveyed Colonel Tench and party to the Japanese reception group.
General Arisue stiffly saluted Colonel Tench and, after introductions, the group entered a tent in the center of the field. General Arisue offered food, but Colonel Tench who had brought his own rations, declined with thanks.
Colonel Tench explained that his party consisted of approximately 150 officers and men and that their directive from the Supreme Commander was divided into four main divisions. It was as follows :
a. Reconnaissance of the Atsugi airdrome area to determine its suitability for the airborne operation to follow.
b. Establishment of required air installations and supplies to support initial phases of the air operations in the area as provided by the Commanding General, FEAF.
c. Supervision and coordination of improvements required at the Atsugi airdrome.
d. Establishment of communications with GHQ, AFPAC, without delay and reporting on suitability or non-suitability of the Atsugi airdrome for the purpose intended. All messages to be transmitted in code. Reporting over signal communications net additional information desired by the Commanding General, FEAF.
While this initial conference took place, soldiers debouched from the planes coming to earth every few moments, unloaded jeeps, and prepared to form exploratory Parties. Colonel Hutchinson, who had been assigned as billeting officer, led the first of these on an inspection of the former Sagamigahara Air Unit barracks at the west end of the airfield. It was proposed by the Japanese that this barracks should serve as accommodations for the advance party. Other Inspection teams immediately deployed over the entire airfield area.
A second flight of fifteen C-54's, C-46's, and C-47's arrived at 0935 and a third group of fifteen C-54's landed at 1100. These planes, carrying a total of 30 officers and 120 men wearing regular combat equipment were escorted by ten carrier-based Seventh Fleet F6F liaison planes flying from Sagami Bay.
The Japanese were amazed by the efficiency with which these Grumman fighters, landing on the grass, folded their wings $B!H(Blike cicadas," even while the planes were taxied into position 67. The Japanese made no attempt to conceal the degree to which they were impressed by the speed with which the Americans motorized themselves and invested the entire field area. Their amazement was outspoken when within forty-five minutes after the leading planes had touched down, portable Signal Corps transmitters were on the air establishing communications with Okinawa. The last planes of the party brought fuel, lubricants, and maintenance equipment to make the intrepid little unit compact and self-sustaining until the anticipated arrival on 30 August of the main airborne force which would constitute the first of the Occupation troops for Japan.
50 This mission was lead by Lt Gen T. Kawabe, who had become Vice Chief of the General Staff in April. There were fifteen other members. They were met at Nichols Field by Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, ACofS, G-2, acting for SCAP, and Col Sydney F. Mashbir of Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, one of G-2's important subsidiary organizations which was to play a vital$B!!(Bpart in the conferences. For a complete report of these events see Vol. I, this series$B!%(B
51 General title was $B!'(BRequirements$B!!(Bof the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P. I., 19 Aug 45 " The specific titles of the documents were $B!J(B1$B!K!H(BOrientation$B!$(BAgenda$B!$(Band$B!!(BRequirements$B!I!$!J(B2$B!K!H(BRequirements for Entry and Operations$B!!(Bof an Advance Party Representing the$B!!(BSupreme$B!!(BCommander$B!!(Bfor$B!!(Bthe$B!!(BAllied Powers within the Tokyo Bay Area,$B!I!J(B3$B!K!H(BRequirements for the Entry of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and His Accompanying Forces,$B!I(B and (4)$B!H(BRequirements for Entry and Operations of Initial Occupation Forces in Kanoya Areas of Southern Kyusyu$B!I(B.
52 GHQ SCAP, Requirements of SCAP presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P I, 19 Aug 45 Sec. II, " Requirements for Entry and Opns of an Adv Party Representing SCAP within the Tokyo Bay Area.$B!I(B
53 Ibid, Sec. $B-7(B, " Requirements for the Entry of SCAP and His Accompanying Forces."
54 Ibid, Sec. IV, " Requirements for the Entry and Opns of Initial Occupation forces in the Kanoya Area of Southern Kyushu."
55 Rad (S) 15&l6, IJG to SCAP, 21 Aug 45.
56 Higashi Kuni, My Memoirs (Tohoshobo, 1947).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Tokyo, Yomiuri-Hochi, 18 Aug 45.
60 Tokyo Shimbun, 17 Sep 45.
61 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 19Aug 45.
62 Higashi Kuni, op cit.
63 GHQ SCAP&USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S).
64 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 29 Aug 45.
65 Maj Gen Seizo Arisue, in charge of the preparation of Atsugi airfield, reported in his unpublished " Memoirs of Atsugi " that for " some strange reason " this aircraft and the following ones came in downwind despite the fact that the Japanese had painstakingly erected an air sock for their guidance. The Americans probably preferred to take their chances with a slightly unfavorable wind than to nose helplessly into some prepared Japanese armoured trap.
66 Col Tench was followed by his immediate staff comprising Capt C. B. Jones, USN,col E.K. Warburton, 5th AF, Cols C. R. Hutchinson and D. M. Dunne, CE, Cols S. S. Auchincloss and L.Park, SigC, and Maj F. Bowers, ATIS interpreter.
67 Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, 29, 31 Aug 45 ; Mainichi Shimbun, 29 Aug 45.
